Deep Dive: Further Conversations about Diplomacy in Ukraine
A round-up of provocative media this week I thought worthy of discussion
As most of you know, I have been thinking heavily about the war in Ukraine, opining about the West’s response and advocating for diplomacy and a peace process. As regards my understanding of war, I’m fairly steadfast in my rejection of it. Iraq was a formative part of my youth, and I have a hard time forgiving the West for its transgressions there, particularly when its enablers are not only allowed to walk around freely but currently sit in the White House. Nonetheless, I admit to many contradictory feelings when it comes to Ukraine. Nothing is as black and white as I would like it to be except general wishes for the war to end and for the Ukrainian people to be free—two sentiments which have been at odds with each other for the past nine months.
Until this week, the only acceptable answer in the West seemed to be unwavering support for Ukraine and a refusal to engage in diplomacy (at least in public). However, in recent weeks, we’ve seen some debate in the Western mainstream with regard to the latter, particularly in the US. This was heightened by the almost complete retreat of the Congressional Progressive Caucus in the United States from a letter demanding President Biden engage in diplomatic conversations with his Russian counterpart. Despite having demanded maintained support for Ukraine militarily, all but one of the thirty democrats rejected the letter they had signed themselves just months earlier.
This walk back was described in detail by Matt Taibbi in his article “The Brutal Comedy of the Withdrawn Peace Letter”. Of particular interest was the attention he gave to Representative Jamie Raskin’s justification for the war, which he quoted:
[Moscow] is a world center of antifeminist, antigay, anti-trans hatred, as well as the homeland of replacement theory for export. In supporting Ukraine, we are opposing these fascist views, and supporting the urgent principles of democratic pluralism.
Taibbi then noted that this was essentially “rebranding” the neoconservative project to “frame foreign conflicts as religious confrontations, doing so using a ‘holy lexicon’ of elite middle management”.
Frame the project as a war to halt the “export” of bigotry by conquering the “world center” of political regression, and you might just get a plurality of voters casting votes to roll the dice [on nuclear war].
Some of this was present during demonstrations here in the Czech Republic, where I reside. The city centre of Prague saw duelling mass protests this past weekend. One called for an end to military support for Ukraine and a renegotiation of Russian gas imports. The crowd tended towards more xenophobic and far-right circles (but certainly not exclusively)—this is the same anti-vaccination coalition that had formed under COVID. It was followed a day later by a major pro-Ukraine demonstration organized by the Million Moments for Democracy movement. The framing here was that the West is a pluralistic place that respects human rights, while Russia is its authoritarian anti-thesis. Sound familiar? As if to underscore this point, an incredibly brave Ukrainian woman came out live on stage in front of 70,000 people in Wenceslav Square. You really can’t do that in Russia.
Nonetheless, despite my own sympathies lying with pluralism, the rhetoric had echoes of George W. Bush’s challenge to the international community: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” I felt myself falling into the great Robert Fisk’s world of rotating allegiances. After all, it was Putin who helped the West after 9/11 in the fight against Islamic terrorism, which in turn led to the horrors of Shock and Awe, Fallujah, etc. But now, of course, Putin is the terrorist—and I don’t disagree!
To make sense of this, I recommend a fantastic interview with George Beebe on the podcast Skulduggery, entitled “The Case for Diplomacy in Ukraine”. Beebe is a former Russian specialist with the CIA and advisor to Vice-President Cheney during the Bush years (not my favourite source, to say the least). The interview reminds us that we are not just fighting ideological wars. While war itself might be unnatural and truly evil, whole countries are not. Russia has a very specific history, specific interests, specific national (and elite) realities, and these lead to very specific ways of looking at problems and how we solve them.
Consider just this one detail mentioned in the podcast. After the fall of the Soviet Union, some 25 million Russians (not just ethnic Russians, but people who identified as of Russia) found themselves in new countries, including those in Crimea and in the Donbas. When Putin came to power, Russia was a failed state, unable to govern, unable to enforce the rule of law. His reign has been successful to a degree in correcting this. Is Putin now continuing this correction on behalf of those 25 million? It certainly doesn’t justify his war, but it does paint a different picture of how we got into this disaster.
Perhaps the most interesting part of the conversation was the acknowledgement that we have a tendency to over-learn lessons. It is entirely possible that we’ve over-learned the lesson from Munich in 1938 but also that of détente and engagement in 1989. More to the point, Beebe points out that very few wars in history have ended in total victory and only at great cost when they have, so perhaps our lesson from 1945 is over-learned as well. We should recall Twain’s quote here, “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.”
There were other voices this week that discussed why Putin has truly been an obstacle to diplomatic solutions thus far. In Lawrence Freedman’s article “Why Putin prefers ‘War-‘War’ to ‘Jaw-Jaw’”, he describes how Putin himself is a huge obstacle to peace and shows no signs of wanting to end the war:
What is striking in all these debates about how to get to a deal is how little Russia contributes. Moscow never says it has no interest in negotiations but then patiently explains why the problem holding them back is Kyiv’s refusal to accede to its demands. Putin has shown no urgency when it comes to bringing the war to a quick conclusion. Even if a serious offer was put on the table we cannot assume that he would give it careful consideration. We need to consider another possibility: that Putin has no interest in ending the war soon if this would require him acknowledging that he has failed to achieve his key objectives.
Essentially, Russia itself and certainly Putinism is at stake were there to be a retreat on the battlefield.
This is his war and he has not hidden what he sought to achieve. Once it is impossible to deny failure then his judgement will be shown to be flawed and his position will become vulnerable. Put crudely for Putin to stay in power Russia needs to stay in the war.
This, perhaps more than anything, highlights why it is so important to begin diplomacy now, laying the ground work for an eventual peace. We must understand how to win this war so the next one will not begin. If Russia is destined to lose (or at least not win), then we must find an acceptable way for them, and Putin, to do so. Freedman’s argument though also makes for a rather compelling case for why more military support is likely necessary before this war will end. Certainly, more convincing than just trying to fight for pluralism on the Russian steppe. It also makes the case that the progressives were largely correct in their rescinded letter. Too bad.
Of course, all this was underscored by the release of Netflix’s remake of All Quiet on the Western Front, which in its literal translation from German, reads “In the West Nothing New”. It is a powerful anti-war film that everyone should watch given the current precipice upon which we sit. The film refrains from presenting any glorification of war or those who fought it. It’s not a film about heroism; rather, it demonstrates the pure hubris of it. Told from the losing side, the soldiers here go naively into war, searching for adventure and honour, to be heroes, only to fight purely for their lives, day in, day out, with most dying in extreme violence. Tens of thousands of young men, boys really, were dying weekly over imperial and nationalist ambitions, over a front line that barely moved throughout the course of the war, depicted here brutally. In its main divergence from the original text, the film shows the military elites continuing to compel men to fight and die even when defeat AND victory were in sight, when those in power were literally debating peace, and even after the armistice had been signed. There is no way of watching this movie without asking yourself, “For what did these men die?” Honour? Pride? Country? Vengeance? Whatever the reasons, the cost of that hubris was death.
If nothing else compels us to work steadfastly towards peace, then this should be it. Regardless of the path, this must be the ultimate goal. War for war’s sake has no winners, and this film makes that clear. It is an important film that should give us all pause. We have a responsibility collectively to end this war, even if it is just through pressure on public opinion.
Considering this "after the fall of the Soviet Union, some 25 million Russians (not just ethnic Russians, but people who identified as of Russia) found themselves in new countries" - I think this would be true of Czechia, even maybe East Germany. Perhaps it’s why you have the two opposing protests on Wenclas Square.